

**AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the
US Security and Intelligence Communities**

**Final Report
November 4, 2007**

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ACRONYMS

AAA – American Anthropological Association

AN – *Anthropology News*

CoE – Code of Ethics of the AAA

DoD – Department of Defense

EB – Executive board of the AAA

FFRDC – Federally-Funded Research and Development Center

HTS – Human Terrain Systems

HUMINT – Human Intelligence

ICSP – Intelligence Community Scholars Program

IRB – Institutional Review Board

MIS – Military, Intelligence, and Security Communities

NDA – Non-Disclosure Agreement

PPR – Principles of Professional Responsibility

PRISP – Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission recognizes both opportunities and risks to those anthropologists choosing to engage with the work of the military, security and intelligence arenas. We do not recommend non-engagement, but instead emphasize differences in kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations. We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing. Given this framework, we offer procedural recommendations to AAA designed to address current and future issues, to foster civil and open discussion of them, and to offer guidance to individual anthropologists who might consider such work.

Key recommendations for the Executive Board include the following:

- 1) Make this report available to the AAA membership
- 2) Offer specific resources (e.g. counseling) to members considering employment or engagement with military and security organizations.
- 3) Consider revision of the AAA Code of Ethics to sharpen guidelines for informed consent and transparency as well as application of the admonition to “Do no harm” those studied
- 4) Devise a system for informing members about funding and employment opportunities related to military and security work while also monitoring such announcements and cautioning members about risks.
- 5) Append to the Code of Ethics or otherwise convey to association members an assessment of activities such as direct engagement with the military, teaching cultural understanding to military, doing organizational studies of the military, forensic study of military victims, and guiding military in cultural preservation.

We invite all anthropologists to think further about the relationship of changing global situations to the changing circumstances of anthropological practice, in the academy and beyond, scholarly and engaged, as research or in other forms, in order to envision opportunities as well as risks that accompany such practice, including diverse local, research-driven, policy, public, and other types of engagement.

We thank the Executive Board for entrusting to us the demanding yet absorbing task of exploring these concerns and for carefully considering the results of our deliberations.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

THE CHARGE

The AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities has undertaken a process of research and deliberation, first exploring the kinds of work anthropologists involved with the military, defense, and intelligence sectors perform, then evaluating the ethical ramifications of such work, particularly in light of the AAA Code of Ethics (CoE). The Commission’s authorization by the Executive Board (EB) of the AAA in November 2005 was prompted in part by the question of whether or not the AAA should publish announcements of job positions, grants and fellowships offered by US security and

intelligence organizations in *Anthropology News* (AN). However, the scope of our discussion soon broadened. In our report we seek to inform the EB about the variety of forms of engagement, the perils and opportunities they pose for individual anthropologists and the discipline, and the procedural mechanisms we recommend the AAA adopt to negotiate questions of engagement responsibly and ethically.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES

The Commission comprises eight members and three subcommittees: Laura McNamara (Sandia National Laboratories) and George Marcus (UC-Irvine), who form the Practitioners subcommittee; Kerry Foshier (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; Institute for National Security and Counter-Terrorism at Syracuse University) and Rob Albro (American University), who form the Institutions Subcommittee; Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (Rhode Island College), Monica Heller (University of Toronto), and David Price (St. Martin's University), who form the Ethics subcommittee; and Chair James Peacock (UNC-Chapel Hill). The Practitioners and Institutions subcommittees focused on ethnography to learn about anthropologists who actually work with military or intelligence communities, interviewing representative anthropologists and examining institutional contexts and expectations for such work. The Ethics subcommittee studied codes by sister organizations and thought through issues faced by anthropologists to generate ethical guidelines. The Commission's work is coordinated jointly by Alan Goodman, AAA President, Paul Nuti, AAA Director of External, International, and Government Relations, and James Peacock; its work concludes with the submission of this final report to the Executive Board in November 2007.

- November 2005: The Commission was authorized by the EB.
- Spring 2006: Commission members were appointed and began discussion by email and teleconference.
- November 2006: The Commission met informally at the 2006 AAA Meetings in San Jose.
- March 2007: Six members of the Commission participated in a series of events at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.
- July 2007: The Commission met at AAA headquarters in Arlington, VA.
- Monthly: Individual Commission members have published monthly commentaries in the AN to inform the membership of our work and elicit opinions. Commission members' views have ranged from those who are skeptical of relations between anthropology and the military to those who, while savvy about pitfalls, consider such relationships potentially or actually productive.
- Ongoing: Deliberations on ethical issues have been informed by ethnographic research to ascertain what anthropologists actually do in relation to security/intelligence work and under what institutional auspices. The variety and complexity of such activities and their contexts are great, arguing against blanket assessment for or against engagement with security and intelligence communities.
- November 2007: Submission of final report to the Executive Board.

POSITION STATEMENT ON ENGAGEMENT

We do not oppose anthropologists engaging with the military, intelligence, defense, or other national security institutions or organizations; nor do we endorse positions that rule such

engagements out *a priori*. Neither, however, do we advocate that anthropologists actively seek employment or funding from national security programs. We see circumstances in which engagement can be preferable to detachment or opposition, but we recognize that certain kinds of engagement would violate the AAA Code of Ethics and thus must be called to the community's collective attention, critiqued, and repudiated. At the same time, we encourage openness and civil discourse on the issue of engagement, with respect and attention paid to different points of view as part of our collective professional commitment to disciplinary learning. While the Commission has reached agreement on this position statement, there remain differing views among its members on specific issues (e.g. the appropriate transparency of such engagements).

REPORT OVERVIEW

The body of the report is organized to reflect the Commission's efforts to document the forms of anthropological engagement with military, intelligence or other national security activity, to understand the ethical implications of these forms of engagement, and to recommend a way forward for the AAA as an organization.

- The first section, "The Big Picture: History and Prospects," reminds us that, though current issues of engagement are our focus, they must be understood within the context of a history of engagements with national security and the changing nature of the discipline itself, as it becomes less focused on, or limited to, academic contexts, and becomes more involved in a variety of private, public, and non-profit sector organizations and activities.
- The second section, "Forms of Engagement and Institutional Contexts," is an attempt to systematically document the diverse forms of anthropological engagement with the complex group of institutions that comprise the security and intelligence communities. We consider forms of engagement from two perspectives: the types of work and responsibilities of individual anthropologists within military, intelligence, or national security institution, and the variety of institutional environments in which these individuals work.
- The third section, "Interpretive Framework for Ethics," explores the ethical approaches to engagement with the national security community by related academic disciplines in the social sciences and area studies and highlights aspects of the AAA CoE most likely to be compromised by engagement with the institutions and activities comprising the national security community.
- The next section considers the "Perils and Opportunities of Engagement" by considering the forms of engagement detailed in section one through the ethical lens described in section two. This analysis takes place both at the level of the individual anthropologist and the discipline at large. We address the potential difficulties of discerning "perils" and "opportunities" given the complex nature of geopolitics and individual values.
- In the final section, we put forward procedural recommendations for the consideration of the Executive Board and provide a list of illustrative examples of forms of engagement with military, intelligence, defense, or other national security institutions or organizations, as well as ethical issues for the individual anthropologist to consider. We recommend that the AAA amend the CoE to directly address issues of engagement and that the EB form a subcommittee to vet advertisements for jobs and fellowships from MIS. We also suggest that the EB institute a counseling body within the AAA that individual anthropologists could consult as they make decisions about engagement.

THE BIG PICTURE: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS

In the century of AAA history, relations among MIS and anthropology have varied, partly depending on the character of USA wars; World War II (a “good” war) evoked patriotic service by anthropology while Vietnam (a “bad” war) evoked condemnation by anthropology of service to MIS. This historical context reminds us that we cannot allow our judgment of what constitutes ethical engagement with MIS on the part of anthropologists and anthropology to be contingent on our approval or condemnation of political policies at a given time.

The May 2005 charge to the Commission largely concerned current and present issues of anthropology’s role in national security entities. However, the EB discussions that led to the founding of the Commission, and indeed the backdrop of the discussions throughout the Commission's life touched repeatedly on envisioned long-term changes in familiar trends in anthropological research as well as its deepening, sustained, and varied involvements with agencies, environments, and topics concerned with enduring conditions of war security, and conflict in both national and transnational contexts. We offer in our Report merely a flavor of these long view observations that were part of our discussions about current conditions. We are only indicating something of the emerging and future complexity of the problems of anthropological research that we did take up, and thus, of directions for extending discussions of the specific findings of the Commission.

It is important to note simply that the issues of the Commission were shaped predominantly by current conditions of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increasing domestic controversies regarding them, and especially, within these, airing in the media of the real and potential contribution of anthropology in military and intelligence operations. The spectrum of the ways and means by which anthropologists might be involved in security, intelligence, and warfare beyond the present context of war is already more diverse, and will even more so in the future, than the Commission was able to address. Certainly, its findings will be applicable to a wide variety of other present and future situations, but the Commission's work was inflected toward the distinctive character of public controversy during its life.

What is needed as a context for further discussion is something analogous to recent histories of the role of research and academia over the long period of the Cold War projected into our future as another period in our coming history of low intensity but sustained conflict that will go on for many years in different forms and episodes, and that will define the environment of anthropological research, among other disciplines. The Commission did not engage in such scenario exercises, but speculations and assumptions about the long term were an integral part of the Commission's discussions mostly about the relationship of anthropology to current military operations. We encourage readers of this report to consider its findings with regard to anticipated futures as much as present controversies.

The longstanding habit in anthropology of marking a divide between applied/practicing anthropological research and independent/academic anthropological research is challenged by their increasing meeting on the same grounds and research terrains. Differences of course remain, but there are new opportunities for interesting dialogues, and the sharing of methods, understandings, and concepts. These new and interesting meetings of applied and academic anthropology were both a condition of work among the membership of

the Commission and of the environments of anthropological research that it reviewed.

Even though research in much of academic anthropology is conceived in very individualistic terms, in fact, the terms and relationships which make such research possible through all of its phases are increasingly collaborative and collective in character. Collaborative relations with sponsors, and with other parallel projects of research, let alone with subjects, requires much more elaborate discussions of ethics and the circulations of information and knowledge, than traditionally developed in anthropology. The situations and cases developed by the Commission gave us a taste of the complexity of contemporary research environments. There is something different and of heightened ethical significance about anthropologists working within or in relation to the defense and security apparatus, but it increasingly seemed to be a difference of quality rather than kind as we considered it against the background of a range of other circumstances of research much like it. So, especially in teaching, discussions of the ethics of anthropological research, including in the area of the military, intelligence, and security, need a complex range of cases.

As a security paradigm may come to modify or even replace the older one of developed during the Cold War, the question of engagement, non-engagement, or even anti-anti-engagement which the Commission began by taking up will seem even more naive than it does now. The challenge will increasingly be to define ethically defensible research in complex environments of collaboration. If whatever is emerging is as pervasive as Cold War culture was, there will be no research project it will not touch. This Commission sought to develop a useful start on the frameworks of ethical thinking based on present controversies, but these frameworks' most interesting applications will occur in the future, as they are challenged by more diverse and pervasive environments in which security considerations define conditions, topics, and implications of research projects.

Looking squarely at an active and viable anthropology engaged in a range of new environments – from human rights to the US defense apparatus – elucidates a more complex reality than perhaps many anthropologists suspected. In recent years, many, mostly academic anthropologists have been relatively more comfortable in defining 'engaged' work in activist terms, that is, in relation to non-governmental actors like NGOs and social movements, rather than working with or for governments, militaries, and official agencies. Increasingly, this distinction cannot be sustained in reality or with integrity, and it increases the general legitimacy of lending expertise in the service of states and international organizations. With its own universities, institutes, and peer-reviewed publications, the MIS apparatus includes a parallel structure to that of the university/academic world within which many of us are comfortable. We need to recognize that some anthropologists define themselves within that structure just as academic anthropologists do within theirs. How the profession of anthropology is to bridge this divide and stay in touch with researchers in such ramifying structures goes far beyond the applied/academic divide. This Commission's work thus addresses the contemporary role of anthropology itself.

FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT: CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS

What we casually call the “national security community” is large, diverse, and difficult to bound, comprising military, intelligence, research, homeland security agencies and programs, as well as private contractors and university research institutions, existing at the local, state, and federal level. Anthropological engagement in these programs, institutions, and organizations is similarly diverse. Hence, assessing anthropologists’ involvement in the US security and intelligence communities is not an easy task. The scope and complexity of national security activities, on the one hand, and anthropological activity on the other, are both considerable – more than the national security community realizes about anthropology, or than the anthropology community recognizes in the national security world. Our assessment attempts to recognize this complexity, but fully characterizing it is not in the scope of this report. We simplify a broad range of activities by illustrating three categories of employment.

GENERAL CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYMENT

Like the larger anthropology community, anthropologists working in the military, intelligence, or other national-security related fields do both basic and applied research, and act as consultants, fieldworkers, and faculty members. Within these professional roles, anthropologists can engage in a wide range of activities: from policy analysis and formulation, to conducting internal organizational studies; from providing pre-deployment cultural training to soldiers, to assisting in on-the-ground military or intelligence operations. Below are some examples of the professional roles that we encountered among the anthropologists we spoke with. The following categories are illustrative and not exhaustive.

Faculty member at a military or intelligence college – We are thinking here of civilian employees of a military college or university. The Department of Defense and several intelligence institutions run their own professional education programs to train and accredit their employees. Faculty in these institutions might come ‘on loan’ from a civilian college or university, but more frequently, they are permanent faculty members who teach courses and do research. As in civilian universities, the working conditions and atmosphere vary. The ability to do research generally is dependent upon outside funding, which can come from the same sources as it would if the faculty member was in a civilian institution. Topics of teaching range from general cross-cultural competence to courses about a specific area or group and may include traditional military topics such as leadership. Research topics are similarly varied. It is possible that faculty in military institutions are more likely to conduct classified research, but we found no empirical evidence to support that hypothesis.

- One special constraint that some military faculty might encounter relates to publication: US law prohibits government employees from doing for-profit or personal work using government time or resources. This causes problems with publication, as it could be construed as an outside or personal activity. Moreover, the government retains the ownership of the copyright. Although the original intent of laws governing personal activity on publicly funded time is laudable, this creates tricky dynamics for academic career development among faculty employed military educational institutions. Most military colleges and universities seem to get around this law by operating on the assumption (don’t ask, don’t tell) that all faculty publications are created in off-hours, using non-government equipment.

Consultant – Consultants may be independent or may work for a larger consulting firm. They may work full-time at consulting as practicing anthropologists, or they may have other jobs in academia, or they may work in a research position for a branch of the government.. Consulting can include anything from helping review a pre-deployment country guide for soldiers to designing a class in anthropological concepts to policy support to fieldwork. Different topics, types of work, and conditions of secrecy bring different kinds of ethical concerns. For example, helping a civil affairs unit get a better understanding of how their internal dynamics help or hinder their interactions with the State Department is not quite the same as helping them understand the local population or an NGO. Likewise, the ethical considerations change if the consultant is working for part of a military organization engaged in kinetic (physical, perhaps violent) operations. Things change again if the consultation is to be kept secret from the subjects of the study or academic colleagues. Things change again if the consultant is wholly supported by consulting fees and must look to the same organizations to pay the bills in the future, as opposed to being supported by an academic salary. Interestingly, military informants report that a small, but significant percentage of their consultants from academia request that they not be identified as having assisted. This type of secrecy, not imposed by the sponsor/employer, but instead by the consultant/academic is something that needs further exploration by the discipline.

Fieldworker – “Fieldworker” is a hat that all anthropologists wear on and off throughout our careers, and it is the one that raises the most complicated ethical issues for practicing and academic anthropologists, regardless of context. For the Commission, the topic of fieldwork was the most controversial form of engagement. Fieldwork is as complicated an activity in the national security community as it is elsewhere.

- Some forms of fieldwork were quite straightforward: for example, we heard from several practicing anthropologists who do institutional fieldwork in military and intelligence agencies. As long as these anthropologists are following appropriate guidelines for disclosure, informed consent, protection of subjects and data, and dissemination of research findings, the Commission found no special considerations that should apply to work conducted inside the national security community.
 - The form of fieldwork that *did* engender a great deal of debate among the Commission members was a (then-hypothetical) situation in which anthropologists would be performing fieldwork on behalf of a military or intelligence program, among a local population, for the purpose of supporting operations on the ground. This raised profound questions about whether or not such activities could be conducted under the AAA’s Code of Ethics, not to mention the requirements of most human studies review boards. Although we considered this situation as a hypothetical example, the emergence of the Human Terrain System demonstrated that our hypothetical musings were not so far off the mark. We discuss HTS in the recommendations below.

The narrative above is neither complete nor sufficient. To give our colleagues some sense of the parameters that shape engagement in the national security community, we have included a *Dimensions of Engagement With the National Security Sector* table. This table, developed by Commission Member Kerry Foshier, illustrates various aspects of engagement and points to the kinds of ethical challenges that arise with different combinations of these parameters. Combining these parameters, and considering the ethical implications that arise in different combinations,

provides a descriptive framework for discussions around ethics and engagement. Some situations might be counterintuitive for most of us: consider a situation in which a research project is kept secret from the scholarly community, but *not* from the local population or community under study – as when an anthropologist employed by a government agency helps a special operation to get medical supplies to a remote town in northern Afghanistan. The anthropologist might go into this work with the agreement that s/he is constrained from publishing an account of that experience. This raises issues in terms of scholarly openness and academic freedom. However, the ethical issues it raises are quite different than those that emerge when an anthropologist is being asked to draw on her research expertise to provide decision makers with advice on infiltrating local institutions in a combat zone to disrupt terrorist networks.


In a later section, we draw upon illustrative examples (see “Strategies for the Individual Anthropologist and Illustrative Examples”) to demonstrate that ethical considerations vary depending on the forms of anthropological engagement with the military, intelligence, or another national security institution. We also have included several thumbnail sketches of specific institutional/contextual situations that are explored in greater detail below. We recommend that readers use both the following table and chart in conjunction with the rest of this report to discuss and consider the risks and benefits of various forms of engagement.

Dimensions of Engagement with the Security Sector – Notes *										
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
sponsor/funder of work	employer of anthropologist	from whom is sponsorship and/or employment concealed, if any	source of material	type of work	research subjects (if any)	teaching topics (if any)	intended beneficiary of work or recipient of research results	from whom are the results of research concealed, if any	from whom is the beneficiary concealed, if any	intent of research/teaching
1 U.S. national security organization or contractor 2 non-U.S. national security organization or contractor 3 academic institution 4 government funding source (without strings) – ex. NSF 5 government funding (with strings) – ex. programs requiring govt service after education or research is complete 6 non-government funding source – ex. Wenner-Gren 7 private or personal funds	1 U.S. national security organization or contractor 2 non-U.S. national security organization or contractor 3 other U.S. government organization at federal, state, or local level 4 other non-U.S. government organization 5 academic institution (U.S. or non-U.S.) 7 self-employed contractor 8 NGO (U.S. or non-U.S.)	1 research subjects 2 academic community and public	1 fieldwork 2 existing research databases and documents 3 combination	1 original research 2 analysis of existing work 3 teaching 4 applied work	1 cultural group of interest to sponsoring entity 2 sponsoring entity 3 U.S. national security organization or contractor (other than sponsor if applicable) 4 U.S. national security organization or contractor 5 other U.S. government organization at federal, state, or local level 6 other non-U.S. government organization 7 business (U.S. or non-U.S.)	1 anthropological concepts and techniques 2 cultural group of interest to sponsoring entity 3 sponsoring entity 4 U.S. national security organization or contractor (other than sponsor if applicable) 5 U.S. national security organization or contractor 6 other U.S. government organization at federal, state, or local level 7 other non-U.S. government organization 8 business (U.S. or non-U.S.)	1 academic community and public 2 U.S. national security organization or contractor 3 non-U.S. national security organization or contractor 4 other U.S. government organization at federal, state, or local level 5 other non-U.S. government organization 6 academic institution 7 business (U.S. or non-U.S.) 8 self-employed contractor 9 NGO (U.S. or non-U.S.)	1 (with understanding that this means deliberate concealment, not simply passive concealment by not publishing or sending results to the research subjects) 2 research subjects 3 academic community and public	* research subjects * academic community and public	* (with understanding that use of research of any sort cannot be controlled once it leaves the researcher) * raise awareness or a group, concept, or technique * influence a group or organization through social, cultural, economic, or political means * increase the ability of the U.S. to cause physical harm to or politically destabilize an organization or group * reduce potential for violent conflict with a group or org * increase ability for x-cultural or inter-org cooperation

*This does not account for the (1) basic debate about whether or not it is acceptable to work within a flawed system, (2) the fact that all research, once made public can be used in ways not intended by the researcher, (3) the fact that all anthropologists conceal some of the research from the public and the academic community to maintain informant confidentiality and to preserve trust and access to the community, (4) the issue of passive concealment of research results, something common in anthropology, especially in cases where making them available to research subjects would require substantial effort and expense to the researcher, (5) the need for some kind of basic statement anthropologists can make other than “no anthropologist ever works for the military or intelligence agencies” (which has never been true in any case) to reassure research communities- maybe “anthropologists are not allowed to lie to research communities about how the results of their work will be used and who sent/funded them.

So – A1; B1; C1,2; D1; E1; F1; G0, H1; I1,2; J1,2, K3 is the combination that causes most concern.

But if you track a couple of other possibilities through, you start to see where things come apart- what if an anthropologist wants to help U.S. special forces troops deliver medical aid to people in northern Afghanistan and works with them to develop a plan, but is constrained from publishing an account of the work?



INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS OF ENGAGEMENT WITH MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE

An accurate assessment of interaction between the anthropology community and the national security community must take into account the varying institutional environments of the US security and intelligence communities. The different mandates and self-perceptions among these organizations shape specific contexts of engagement, and make some forms of engagement more likely (and sometimes more troublesome) than others. Institutional environments vary in terms of the kind of organization (public or private? Military or civilian?); the organization's respective biases and priorities, the degree of secrecy its work entails, sources of data and use of research subjects, and generally, kinds of work undertaken. Appendix A provides an overview of four illustrative institutional environments in terms of the aforementioned factors to give a sense of the diversity of contexts of engagement. This Appendix provides an overview of: 1) Civilian or government intelligence agencies (Central Intelligence Agency); 2) military intelligence organizations (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity); 3) institutions of professional military education (Air University); and 4) an emerging arrangements category. The institutional discussion provides a starting basis for comparison across the spectrum of institutional environments we need to consider for the purposes of our discussion.

Lastly, we note that “engagement” tends to be framed in terms of traditional anthropological theory and practice: ethnographic fieldwork involving human subjects, reading ethnographies, analyzing textual data, providing advice to decision makers. However, new forms of engagement are emerging. For example, with the recent explosion of interest in computational social science (social network analysis, agent-based models, systems dynamics models, and the like), we are aware of an increasing number of anthropologists being recruited to participate in the development of “predictive” modeling and simulation tools for policymakers. This is an area of method and theory about which anthropologists know little: we have little history with modeling and simulation tools in the way that other fields have (physics and engineering, for example), and we know very little about policy formulation. Yet modeling and simulation tools are being widely adopted in the policymaking community, so people working on these projects could indeed be impacting human lives. How the CoE or human studies requirements apply to these projects is not well-defined, and bears watching and continued discussion over the coming months and years.

INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS

Our framework for evaluating the ethics of anthropologists' engagement with US intelligence and defense communities is grounded in four basic principles: to do no harm; to provide disclosure of one's work and role / not to deceive; to uphold the primary responsibility to those involved in one's research; and to maintain transparency, making research accessible to others to enhance the quality and potential effects of it as critique.

We focus on two tasks: establishing guidelines to help individual anthropologists assess the ethical implications of various kinds of engagement with MIS, and generating recommendations for the AAA's conduct as an organization. We believe that offering a process of consultation will aid anthropologists in deciding whether and/or how to engage with MIS. Given the shifting borders between academic and applied anthropology and emerging projects of engagement, we also note the value of description over prescription in helping individual anthropologists make decisions and the AAA craft organizational policies. We recognize the threat of partisanship and

need to retain a focus on ethics rather than political motivations. Our ultimate goal is to prompt and inform discussion about engagement so that anthropologists can mine its opportunities and avoid its pitfalls.

The US MIS sectors seek to employ anthropologists for a variety of tasks. We differentiated between among at least four categories of tasks: policy, organizational study, cultural training, and operations. These categories vary in the ethical considerations they raise for anthropologists.

ETHICAL CODES OF RELATED ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES

The ethical codes and policies of other academic disciplines help professionals navigate the terrain of military engagements. There is no exceptional case for anthropology despite often raised rationales of special methods and cross-cultural contexts. The American Psychological Association has recently reaffirmed its 1986 Resolution Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and established new guidelines for psychologists present during interrogations. When psychologists are faced with difficult ethical dilemmas, they are encouraged to consult with others, both inside and outside their field. Anthropologists might consider adopting a similar approach, though this approach has its own shortcomings. The American Sociological Association has retained a complaint and grievance procedure for enforcement of its CoE through its Committee on Professional Ethics (COPE) with sanctions of withdrawal of privileges or termination of membership, although the whole process, including final determinations, is confidential.

Some professional associations have adopted policies that limit interactions with military and intelligence agencies. In 1996 the Middle East Studies Association adopted a resolution urging its members and their institutions not to accept National Security Education Program (NSEP) funding; in 2002 it felt compelled to adopt a resolution defending the academic freedom of its members to express ideas and opinions that are unpopular. The African Studies Association passed a resolution in 2005 in support of the transparent dissemination of research and against secret research, grants or fellowships whose priorities are determined by the priorities of military and intelligence agencies. In 1983, the Latin American Studies Association established prohibitions against accepting advertising for jobs in the intelligence or military establishment of any country.

THE ROLE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE AAA CODE OF ETHICS

The AAA's first ethics code, the Principles of Professional Responsibility (PPR, 1971), enunciated the core principle that "anthropologists' paramount responsibility is to those they study." The 1998 CoE restated this core ethical principle as "anthropological researchers have primary ethical obligations to the people, species, and materials they study and to the people with whom they work." The CoE states that "Anthropological researchers must do everything in their power to ensure that their research does not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research, or perform professional activities." (CoE, A.2) Engagement of anthropologists in national security agencies may create conflicts or dilemmas whereby the principle of 'doing no harm' to the people studied may be compromised.

The AAA CoE states, “anthropologists bear responsibility for the integrity and reputation of their discipline” (B.2). Anthropologists working in non-transparent military and intelligence settings can cause others to raise questions regarding anthropology’s integrity and reputation.

Anthropological ethics may be compromised by national security mandates that conflict with standards of full informed consent of participants in research. Pre-1986 versions of the CoE offered more clarity on such interactions with the proviso that, “classified, or limited dissemination restrictions that necessarily and perhaps understandably are placed upon researchers do conflict with openness, disclosure, and the intent and spirit of informed consent in research and practice. Adherence to acknowledged standards of informed consent that conflict with conditions for engagement with national security agencies may result in a decision not to undertake or to discontinue a research project” (CoE 1971-1986). As discussed in the “Recommendations” section, the AAA Ethics Committee may wish to examine the possibility of reincorporating such language into the current CoE.

Because anthropologists who work in military and intelligence settings often encounter secrecy and reduced transparency, significant ethical issues may be raised depending on the specific nature of the work. The ethical issues arising during anthropological research of military and intelligence organizations necessarily differ from the ethical issues arising when anthropological research is done for military and intelligence organizations.

When anthropologists study military and intelligence organizations as topics of research, the primary ethical issues raised are the same as those faced by any ethnographer working with any other studied population. These ethical issues primarily concern disclosing who the researchers are and what will be done with the data. Additionally, researchers must acquire informed consent and permission must be obtained in advance as to whether individuals wish to remain anonymous or be identified. In these settings, anthropologists with the consent of their ‘informants’ may ethically use secrecy in the practice of protecting informants with pseudonyms.

Anthropologists working for military and intelligence agencies can face different ethical issues regarding secrecy than anthropologists using secrecy to protect studied populations. The ethical use of secrecy to protect studied populations is fundamentally different than using secrecy to protect the interests of employers, and anthropologists need to recognize that their respective interests may conflict. The use of the single word *secrecy* in describing the relationships one has with a) one’s employer or contractor and b) one’s studied population should not blind anthropologists to the different meanings of the word in these two contexts. The use of secrecy to protect the interests of employers has no ethical or historical relationship to ethnographers’ traditional use of secrecy to protect studied populations.

Anthropologists providing non-public reports without receiving permission from studied populations to provide such reports risk violating assumed and negotiated ethical commitments to the principles of disclosure of the research goals, funding source, and the obtaining of informed consent as described in the CoE. Anthropologists presenting public reports more easily avoid these ethical pitfalls through public dissemination of knowledge that is generally understood or specifically negotiated with studied populations.

Both applied and non-applied anthropologists have at times carried out their research in less than full compliance with current ethical standards inside and outside anthropology. Indeed, the discourse on professional ethics in the discipline has been uneven and punctuated by periodic crises. The AAA and the membership share a responsibility to conduct a vigorous discussion over the importance of what openness and disclosure mean in relationship to engagement with MIS.

Anthropologists' engagements with military and intelligence agencies have the potential to damage relationships of trust with the people studied as well as the reputation of the discipline. Thus, continuous monitoring and debate of the ethical issues raised by specific interactions between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies is recommended, as this relationship evolves in the current era.

PUTTING ETHICS INTO PRACTICE

All anthropologists are responsible for understanding and applying to the best of their ability the discipline's CoE in their research, consulting, and teaching activities. Anthropologists working in any applied field - and particularly in the complicated worlds of military, intelligence, or law enforcement - share the same responsibilities, and must work with their sponsoring institutions to ensure that they are not compromising the safety, privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of their research subjects. Both the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology provide ethical guidance to their members, as do the disciplines' other professional organizations and subsections. In addition, all anthropologists should be familiar with more general human subjects guidance, even when it is not directly tailored to anthropological research: for example, the Helsinki Declaration and the Belmont Report both outline general principles for safeguarding human beings in research situations.

The risks and benefits that attend the expansion of the anthropological workplace are, perhaps, most sharply magnified - and certainly most fraught - in national security institutions that wield legal, political, and even physical power, often outside the scrutiny of the public. Given the political, social, physical, and fiscal power that the intelligence, law enforcement, and military institutions wield, responsible researchers will give ethical guidelines additional consideration and thought in these contexts.

In addition to understanding their professional ethical responsibilities, anthropologists working in, for, or under contract to national security agencies should ask careful questions about the scope and scale of the work; the degree to which the researcher will have control over the research process, including design, data gathering, control over data, particularly data pertaining to human subjects; freedom of interpretation and expression, and the extent to which other areas of the institution will be able to draw on what the anthropologist gathers - and to what purpose.

Government culture can be a shock for scholars who are not familiar with its workings. Secrecy is a major and complicated theme in government, with rules and rituals that vary across and even within agencies. Addressing the problem of secrecy in government is well beyond the scope of this report, but it is important for anthropologists to recognize that secrecy takes different forms, depending on the context. Anthropologists contemplating work in a government (or even private) institution should be prepared to raise ethical issues before accepting employment when they are asked to work in or around conditions of secrecy. Secrecy ups the ethical ante and requires that

one carefully consider the nature of the engagement: does the work involve original research? Does it involve work with human subjects? If so, are these vulnerable populations? Who will use the knowledge and how? Will the research findings be restricted? We cannot address all these issues in this report, but we invite scholars who work in classified environments to write and educate their colleagues about their experiences and the impact of secrecy requirements on their research.

A general rule of thumb is to remember that the greater the potential risk to human subjects and the higher the level of secrecy surrounding the effort, the greater the risk of ethical violations, including harm to human beings or their environment. As burdensome as most IRBs (Institutional Review Boards that assess ethics of research projects) are for anthropologists, government-sponsored human subjects research, particularly that taking place in or around classified environments, represents one instance in which anthropologists might actually *welcome* the support of an IRB in generating and formalizing an institutional commitment to fair and ethical treatment of potential research subjects. Sponsors who refuse to allow a research design to go through an IRB, who have not considered the ethical implications of the research design and outcomes, or who brush aside issues of participant well-being, should be treated as suspect (or dreadfully naïve).

Of particular concern are so-called “compartmented” projects, in which the researcher is conducting original work as part of a larger effort controlled and managed by others. In compartmented projects, the researcher typically has no knowledge about a) what others are doing or b) how her or his work fits into larger goals. This becomes very problematic when conducting work on human populations. Indeed, it is difficult to see how human studies work conducted in a compartmented environment can be pursued ethically, since the researcher may have no understanding of, or input into, how findings will be applied, and obviously cannot communicate risks or benefits to subjects. Deliberately and consciously pursuing compartmented work that involves human beings - for example, conducting a secret ethnographic study - without questioning the larger ethical issues involved, represents a gross abdication of scholarly responsibility. Such projects would not be likely to pass any human studies or institutional review board and should be avoided at all costs. *We have not heard of any such projects* at present, but note their historical existence and that we would be unlikely to have heard of current projects of this nature. However, anthropologists asked to participate in any secret research involving unwitting human subjects should seize the opportunity to educate sponsors about legal and ethical issues in human studies, using the Belmont Report, the Helsinki Declaration, and our own AAA CoE - and then refuse to have anything to do with them.

PERILS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF ENGAGEMENT

Many anthropologists have commented on a growing interest within government in anthropology – or, perhaps more accurately, “culture.” This trend may be attributable to a number of factors, including the dissolution of the Cold War world; globalization and internationalization; growing public appreciation for applied anthropology; and the spread of national security discourse into new institutions and environments. On one hand, policymakers' interest in culture is evidence of the U.S. government's difficulty in making sense of phenomena like radicalized terrorist networks, and in dealing with sectarian civil conflict and anti-occupation insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this environment, it is not surprising that the “cultural” knowledge

generated by anthropologists is perceived in some (but likely not all) sectors of the military, intelligence, defense, and security communities as a valuable source of information for everything from intelligence analysis for identifying nascent terrorism networks, to nation-building efforts, to counterinsurgency operations. However, there is more driving government agencies' interest than a chaotic, multicultural national security environment. Over the past two decades, anthropologists have made tremendous headway into non-profit, industry, and government settings, applying ethnographic techniques and anthropological frames to projects ranging from rural development to assembly lines for the automotive industry. The ascendancy of “culture,” applied anthropology, and interdisciplinary research means that anthropological tools, theories, methods, and frames are themselves pervading new realms. This represents a “window” for anthropology that entails opportunities and perils at a number of levels: the discipline, the institutions engaged, the individual anthropologist, and – most importantly – the people with whom we work and study.

THE COMPLEXITY OF DISCERNING PERILS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The Commission’s work elucidates the difficulties of the AAA providing a foolproof list of “dos and don’ts” regarding engagement with the security sector. Such difficulties may be related to three aspects of the terrain: 1) engagement takes so many forms, across both categories of employment and institutional contexts, that almost any form of doing anthropology can ultimately be understood as a form of engagement; and 2) complex and often intersecting relations of power in the practice of anthropology may make it difficult to determine in advance which responsibilities have priority over which and to whom. The discussions of the Commission suggest that a neutral position regarding engagement with security institutions may be non-existent in many situations. To engage comes with risks of contributing to institutions with policies and practices one may oppose. However, to avoid or decry engagement in every case precludes one from taking advantage of opportunities to enhance cultural understanding and even, in some cases, uphold ethical commitments.

We concluded that there is nothing inherently unethical in the decision to apply one's skills in a security context. Instead, the challenge for all anthropologists is finding ways to work in or with these institutions, seeking ways to study, document, and write openly and honestly to an anthropological audience about them, in a way that honors the discipline's ethical commitments. This discussion is extended in the final section of the report: “Strategies for the Individual Anthropologist and Illustrative Examples.”

PERILS OF ENGAGEMENT

While anthropologists may work in military, intelligence, defense, or other national security settings – informing knowledge bases, policies, and practices – without encountering serious ethical perils, many forms of engagement with these communities are potentially ethically perilous. Depending on the work undertaken (see “Forms of Engagement” section), violating ethical tenets is a risk – lower in some circumstances, quite high in others. More specifically, engagement with communities that wield power so directly always entails concerns about: 1) obligations to those studied; 2) perils for the discipline and one’s colleagues; 3) and perils for the broader academic community; and 4) secrecy and transparency.

Obligations to Those Studied

Codes of ethics for anthropological fieldwork, including the current AAA CoE, emphasize a primary responsibility to “do no harm” to those one studies. Some anthropological engagements with military or intelligence agencies risk bringing harm to the people studied. In military settings where occupations are routinely designated “liberations,” questions of whether anthropological knowledge is used “for” or “against” studied populations are complex. In such contexts, programs such as Human Terrain Systems (HTS) research (discussed in Appendix C) are framed by the military as undertaken to “protect” studied populations, but HTS studies also present risks of using cultural research against studied populations. Moreover, anthropologists working in military settings may face problems in achieving *meaningful informed and voluntary consent* from human subjects. Efforts to gain informed consent in militarized regions are at best problematic, and at worst corrupt. The possibility of informed consent occurring in theatres of war is highly problematic and anthropologists working in such environments risk compromising professional ethical commitments to non-coercive forms of informed consent. In addition, when anthropologists use knowledge gained from previous fieldwork for ends other than those anticipated and disclosed at the time of research, there are risks of betraying negotiated trusts and ethically sanctioned relationships established with researched populations.

Anthropologists working in military and intelligence settings risk miscalculating how their contributions will be selectively used, abused, and ignored by the agencies in which they work. The history of applied anthropology and military research is filled with instances where anthropological research and recommendations is ignored when it is counter to institutional assumptions. As Alexander Leighton’s bitter Second World War experiences in the War Relocation Authority and the Office of War Information led him to skeptically conclude: “the administrator uses social science the way a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination.” Anthropologists who engage with military and intelligence agencies with little understanding of these historical dynamics may not understand the limited control over what becomes of their work in such settings.

Perils for the Discipline and Colleagues

Because of the established past historical actions of specific intelligence agencies, anthropological engagements with these agencies may carry potential perils for anthropology’s disciplinary reputation. For example, anthropologists’ engagements with the CIA risk tainting anthropology’s reputation, given the CIA’s well documented historical role in assassinations, kidnappings, rigging foreign elections, torture, unethical human experiments, extreme renditions, supporting death squads, anti-democratic campaigns to undermine foreign governments, and supporting foreign coups in support of American business interests. Because these past interactions are well documented, and well known (especially outside of the US) the reputation of American anthropology could suffer by increased nontransparent engagements with these agencies. The recognition of this situation does not imply that anthropologists working for these agencies are engaged in unethical or improper activities; only that knowledge of institutional histories can diminish anthropology’s disciplinary reputation.

Anthropologists’ engagements with the military or intelligence communities risk transforming the discipline into a tool of oppression. Given anthropology’s historical roots as a stepchild of colonialism and more recent uses of fieldwork as a front for conducting espionage, the

precedence of these risks is well established. Engagement risks the recurrence of such unethical behavior. Moreover, were anthropologists to be perceived as aiding and abetting U.S. military aggression or (even) information collection, that perception might well inhibit other and future anthropologists from establishing relationships of hospitality or trust with study populations or colleagues who are not U.S. nationals.

Lastly, with increased media attention devoted to anthropologists' roles in military and intelligence settings, non-military/intelligence anthropologists may face increased accusations of being agents of military or intelligence organizations. Such accusations may place non-military/non-intelligence anthropologists' personal safety at risk.

Perils for the Academic Community

University-based anthropologists who engage public or private sector security agencies and do not publicly disclose these relationships risk damaging the possibility for maintaining openness in academic environments. If, for example, funding programs linked to intelligence agencies such as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP) and the Intelligence Community Scholars Program (ICSP) do not publicly identify program participants, then such hidden relationships risk using other unwitting academics to actively contribute knowledge to be used by intelligence agencies. If recipients of such intelligence agency-linked programs engage in human subject research without disclosing their relationship to these programs, they violate ethical standards of disclosure and informed consent; such violations may also subject educational institutions to legal action and may jeopardize the institution's compliance with Institutional Review Board standards. The "payback" requirements of PRISP, ICSP and other programs (such as the National Security Education Program) may create conditions in which students undertake fieldwork abroad without fully disclosing that they have contractually agreed to future employment in either known or unknown intelligence or national security agencies. Such nondisclosure of contractual obligations to future employers would violate the CoE's disclosure requirements.

Like other applied anthropological projects working in closed bureaucratic settings, anthropologists working in closed or secret military and intelligence settings risk transforming their writing, analysis, and recommendations to fit the institutional culture. Anthropologists working for military and intelligence agencies may find themselves working in conditions of reduced academic freedom in which their abilities to raise questions counter to institutional presumptions are limited. Conditions of secrecy can damage the self-corrective features of academic discourse.

Issues of Secrecy and Transparency

The AAA CoE requires that anthropologists be transparent, informing both those one studies about what one is doing and to report to the wider scientific community about what one learns. The risks of the potential perils identified above are intensified by conditions of secrecy and non-transparency. Specific anthropological engagements with military and intelligence agencies raise different issues. Anthropologists conducting studies *of* military and intelligence agencies, tend to face fewer of the previously identified perils than anthropological studies *for* military and intelligence agencies. As anthropologists engage with various MIS agencies, these and other risks must be reduced by maintaining normal standards of transparency and non-coercion.

Individual anthropologists should consult the AAA CoE and disengage from activities that violate the code.

OPPORTUNITIES OF ENGAGEMENT

The military, security, and intelligence communities are not alone in increasingly recognizing the value of anthropological expertise. Indeed, the success of applied anthropology and the growth of interdisciplinary research means that our tools, theories, methods, and frames are pervading new realms: government agencies, corporations, computer-based communities, laboratories, the thinking of policymakers, both at home and abroad. Though this presents new ethical challenges for individual practitioners and the discipline, it also represents a “window” of opportunity for anthropology beyond new employment and funding opportunities for individual anthropologists. We highlight several in the following paragraphs, including: 1) education; 2) expanding the discipline into new spheres; 3) studying organizations from the inside; and 4) working on the ground.

Education

One opportunity of engagement is the chance to educate about the discipline. Despite a growing interest in anthropology, most institutions remain strikingly naïve about our discipline's fraught history with institutions of power. Many people in the military and intelligence communities are largely unaware that scandals like Project Camelot still loom enormously in the collective anthropological memory, and tend to attribute anthropologists' protests to present-day politics, rather than disciplinary history or ethics. In a very real sense, our reluctance to engage with institutions that make us uncomfortable - military or corporate - means that anthropologists are missing an opportunity to educate policymakers about how our discipline has evolved, and to emphasize the impact on the discipline of the ethical scandals of the 1960s and the ongoing evolution of our CoE. To educate entails direct contact and dialogue with people in the military, intelligence, and security communities.

Secondly, while fields like corporate anthropology have grown rapidly in the past two decades, many outsiders still perceive anthropology as the study of language, mores, customs, beliefs, ways, etc. of an alien Other. The idea that anthropologists study and critique their own culture, and that they are capable of and interested in doing so inside the agencies that want to hire them, is not the first concept that pops to mind when non-anthropologists think of anthropology. The notion of anthropology as a form of cultural critique is completely foreign in most government agencies, although some have begun turning the ethnographic lens on their own internal workings.

Thirdly, our current theories and methods have grown in directions that non-anthropologists often have a hard time grasping. If anthropologists left structural-functionalism behind years ago, recent discussions about HTS indicate that others have not. The idea of culture as an historically contingent, power-laden, dynamic and emerging property of human relations, and the theoretical and methodological entanglements that such a view implies, are largely lost on people who equate “culture” with a set of discrete and static elements that can be neatly catalogued, captured, stored, and pulled out to support decision making.

Finally, when conducting classroom-based instruction of military or intelligence personnel, anthropologists may provide specific cultural information sensitizing troops (and others) to cultural features that might be misread in specific encounters.

Expanding the discipline into new spheres

The second opportunity is to expand the discipline's reach into non-traditional spheres of knowledge production. Government, private, and hybrid public-private institutions - for example, Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) - comprise an independent intellectual environment that has been largely invisible to anthropology. In some fields, close ties between academic departments and government/private/hybrid institutions are normal: for example, government and industrial sponsorship for funding for physics and engineering meant that graduates in these fields could pursue careers spanning academia, industry and government institutions, while publishing in academic journals and maintaining close ties to the academic world. In contrast, anthropology has been most strongly rooted in universities. Hence, we have only limited familiarity with such entities as FFRDCs, the national laboratories, or the Department of Defense's system of Professional Military Education - which entails dozens of schools, training centers, and even universities across the country, and which comprises its own academic research and training world.

As more anthropologists accept teaching and/or research positions in military universities, with FFRDCs, or with government laboratories, our collective ties to these institutions will likely grow. Moreover, anthropologists who work in interdisciplinary research teams and in applied projects have an opportunity to introduce the complex anthropological ethos - curiosity, respect, and relativism balanced with critique - to the people with whom they work. In doing so, they are influencing how anthropology is perceived and understood.

Studying organizations from the inside

Another potential benefit of anthropologists' collective entry into corporate workplaces and government hallways is a more nuanced understanding of how hidden cultures of power actually function. After all, despite Laura Nader's famous injunction to "study up!," ethnographies of powerful people remain few and far between. Although anthropologists are quick to criticize powerful institutions, we also tend to be disconnected from centers of power. Organizations, private and public, are the locus of American society, but our historical focus on the ethnographic "others" means that anthropologists tend to know little about how big bureaucracies work. Most anthropologists have only a limited understanding of the inner workings of government agencies; we have failed to grasp their internal diversity or discursive complexity. Our native sense of what it is like to be a member of one of these institutions is limited, which presents a significant barrier to understanding the role of bureaucracies in shaping the character of the American nation-state. Public and private organizations, bureaucracies and think tanks and corporations, are the locus of social and political life in the US, yet our exposure to institutions of power remains very limited. Ultimately, if anthropologists are unwilling to consider engagement with MIS, they may neglect an intellectual responsibility to understand these organizations and an ethical responsibility to speak truth to power and engage policy makers. An engagement with organizations entails not only studying powerful individuals, but the range of people who work within these environments. However, anthropologists working in

these organizations may have unacceptable limits placed on their academic freedom and limits to ask and answers questions of their own choosing.

Working on the ground

Anthropologists' expertise on specific cultures, conflict resolution, language and cultural expertise, and human rights can reduce the likelihood of violent encounters. For example, we know of several anthropologists – mostly European – who have worked on the ground with peacekeeping operations. The presence of an anthropologist can be particularly valuable in the context of a multinational force, where cultural differences among institutions and states can quickly undermine the cooperation required for successful peacekeeping. Moreover, anthropologists have assisted peacekeeping forces in establishing productive relationships with local communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OVERVIEW

We have found no single model of “engagement,” so issuing a blanket condemnation or affirmation of anthropologists working in national security makes little sense. Moreover, this very formulation – engagement vs. non-engagement – is itself problematic because it suggests that there is only one choice to be made in a monolithic military, intelligence, and security environment. With this in mind, we lay out procedural recommendations for the AAA, as well as suggest that the AAA provide ethical and pragmatic advice to individual anthropologists contemplating research or employment in an area that falls under the broad MIS banner. We recognize both the opportunities and perils that accompany engagement. On the one hand, the global situation calls for engagement. Since the Cold War, localized conflicts pitting culturally divided groups have increased the need for cultural knowledge and awareness of dynamic global forces. Anthropologists can contribute to this need and shape kinds of engagement and directions of policy; alternatively they can abstain from involvement and condemn the involvement of others. However, the discussions of the Commission suggest that a neutral position regarding engagement with public and/or private security institutions may be non-existent in many situations. Engagement brings risks of contributing to institutions with policies and practices one may oppose, but avoiding engagement in every case precludes one from taking advantage of opportunities to enhance cultural understanding and even, in some cases, uphold ethical commitments. There is nothing inherently unethical in the decision to apply one's skills in these areas. Instead, the challenge for all anthropologists is finding ways to work in or with these institutions, seeking ways to study, document, and write transparently and honestly to an anthropological audience about them, in a way that honors the discipline's ethical commitments.

Anthropologists must, however, remain cognizant of the risks engagement entails to populations studied (through information-sharing about fieldwork, applications of knowledge gained from fieldwork, tactical support and operations), to the discipline and their colleagues, and to the broader academic community. The CoE should remain the focal point for discussions of professional ethics and we recommend that the emergent issues surrounding security be considered in the next revision of the CoE. Given the variegated nature of engagement between anthropology and the government, the internal heterogeneity of both, and the continuing development of contexts for engagement within this context, and in similarly thorny ethical domains (such as working with transnational corporations, for example), we stress the

importance of the AAA addressing engagement over the long term, facilitating ongoing collegial deliberation to aid individual decisions. The issues involved here are emotionally charged and go to the heart of different perceptions of the nature of anthropology as a discipline. Notably, for some members anthropology is always political, while for others anthropology and politics remain distinct. In order for the AAA to be a space for productive debate, we need to attend to multiple views. The Commission's view is that under current conditions (which may, of course, change) it is important to act in ways that allow for a broad representation of (often controversial) views to be expressed and debated within the AAA.

PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Communication

- Make the Commission's final report available to the entire membership of the AAA by linking to its full text on the AAA website.
- Encourage continued openness and civil discourse on the issue of engagement with security institutions, among AAA members. It is unacceptable to demonize people who have chosen career paths in the national security community, simply because of their political viewpoints, choice of employer, or other affiliation. In a professional academic society like the AAA, civil discourse and respectful exchange should be the norm, while closed minds are unacceptable. We encourage members to continue thoughtful and long-term public discussion of the ethical nuances of engagement in print fora; for example, by publishing articles in such venues as *Anthropology News*.

Member Counseling on National Security Sector Employment

Experienced anthropologists should be encouraged to provide counseling to members facing the question of whether and how to engage with national security institutions. A counseling body could be comprised of people from the Ethics Committee and AAA members with experience with these institutions.

Code of Ethics

The Commission recommends that emergent issues surrounding engagement with military, security, and intelligence be considered in the next revision of the CoE. Specifically, the language of the CoE should be revisited or revised to include:

- Secrecy as a condition for funding, employment, research, written "products," or other applications of anthropology; the Ethics Committee or general membership should consider reinstating former language on secrecy from the 1971 CoE (sections 1.g, 2.a, 3.a, and 6).
- The concept of informed consent including multiple settings in which it may be compromised, undermined, or rendered impossible to obtain. In particular, develop specific language regarding work with vulnerable populations and contexts in which consent may not be free, voluntary, or non-coerced.
- Differentiating between activities that are politically distasteful and those that are ethically problematic (e.g., draw distinctions between anthropological research and intelligence gathering, focusing on the activity itself, not on whether one agrees with the politics that motivated a war that it might serve or inhibit).
 - What is the ultimate intent or effect of the activity?
 - Is there any way to determine if any research will have "detrimental" effects? How? On whom? What are the warning signs?

- Should the CoE assess such intents or effects (e.g. war)?

Applied work: Amend the CoE by elaborating a section on “applied” work (collaborate with SfAA or NAPA) and/or append either the Commission’s entire report or the section on strategies for the individual anthropologist to the current code. We recommend that the EB support and encourage education about the CoE and find ways to foster discussion. This should include sponsoring “safe space” discussions at the annual meeting and section meetings where anthropologists can explore the ethical considerations of current and future projects.

Publishing Announcements for Military, Security, and Intelligence Employment in the Anthropology News

- Preface all announcements of jobs, grants, and fellowships posted in AN with a cautionary rider advising AAA members to consult the CoE before accepting any position or funding,
- Create an EB subcommittee of three to evaluate potentially problematic ads (such as HTS, where there are problems with informed consent; or PRISP, where institutional nondisclosure may run afoul of the AAA CoE standards). Ads explicitly identified as offering intelligence, military, or other national security jobs or grants/fellowships would be tagged by AN staff for review by this subcommittee, which would then advise staff by rapid response to either a) publish the ad in AN, with advice to consult the CoE and/or the counseling service, or b) not publish the ad in AN but list contact information, with advice to consult the CoE and/or counseling service. *Rationale*: This plan of action would alert AAA members to both opportunities and o risks, and it also would allow the AAA to address unanticipated problems (e.g. a surplus of MIS ads).

STRATEGIES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL ANTHROPOLOGIST AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

We suggest that the EB make the following recommendations for individual strategies regarding engagement with MIS. These strategies are written with the image in mind of individuals having to navigate complicated, changing and often unclear terrain, in which it is difficult to foresee all the consequences of their actions.

- Use the AAA CoE as your guide. Whether you are thinking of seeking or accepting employment or other work (say, a contract, or a consultation); or acting as an unpaid advisor; or find your work unexpectedly of interest to parties you had never imagined as readers; look to the CoE to work through whether what you are being asked to do (or what you have done) is ethical.. The Commission also recommends that the AAA set up a means for members to consult other anthropologists on issues of engagement that they find problematic.
- Work transparently: Everyone involved needs to know who you are, what you are doing, what your goals are, and who will have access and when to the information you are given (and what form this information will be in). Do not participate in funding programs that will not publicly disclose sources of funding.
- Do no harm: Take the actions you need to take to make sure your work harms no one directly and, to the extent possible, indirectly.
- Be clear about your responsibilities: Work through and communicate to all involved to whom you are primarily responsible, and for what
- Publish your work: Make sure to share the results of your work publicly to the extent possible

Illustrative Examples

- a) Should anthropologist A take employment with a form of direct engagement (e.g. HTS program)?
 - a. This form of engagement, which falls into the “operations” category, requires careful assessment. On the one hand, some argue that direct engagement offers the most immediate results, including possible benefits to local populations (e.g. by mitigating conflict). On the other hand, this form of engagement is unlikely to accord with the ethical provisions of the AAA CoE. The anthropologist has an ethical and professional responsibility to make sure that basic human subjects and AAA ethical requirements are fully addressed. If these requirements are not fully addressed, then professional anthropologists should decline to participate in the project.
- b) Should anthropologist B teach cultural understanding to members of a military platoon slated for deployment in Iraq?
 - a. If this occurs in a way that does not violate the tenets of the CoE or other grounding human studies documents, such as the Belmont Report or the Helsinki Declarations.
- c) Should anthropologist C do organizational studies of the military?
 - a. Yes, but with consideration of the impact of publication and classification restrictions on the research, and keeping in mind that classified status of findings may violate AAA’s transparency tenets. Once again, we call attention to the importance of protecting human research subjects. Anthropologists must always ensure that their sponsoring institution is willing to let them adhere to basic human subjects protections, and must develop a rigorous protocol prior to conducting research. In addition, all anthropologists should seek venues for openly publishing their work, and should negotiate openness and transparency in research before work commences. Many anthropologists who work in restricted access environments (e.g., government classified and proprietary industrial) are able to publish their research findings and we applaud their openness and encourage others to follow their example.
- d) Should anthropologist D do forensic study of apparent victims of a military incursion in order to prosecute?
 - a. In this case the interaction between anthropology and the institution in question would seem to reverse the expected power dynamic, with the consequences of anthropology leading to sanctioning or worse of the military unit(s) involved. In this form of engagement, as with the others, anthropologists must be careful to adhere to the tenets of the Code of Ethics; for example, reflecting on any harm anthropological work might produce.
- e) Should anthropologist E provide guidance on the preservation of cultural resources during times of war?
 - a. So long as cooperation with the parties involved is transparent and otherwise adheres to Code of Ethics guidelines. Anthropologists, particularly archaeologists, might work with the International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) to protect the world’s cultural heritage by coordinating preparations to meet and respond to emergency situations (e.g., establishing training manuals, maintaining lists of resource personnel, advocating in public forums, etc.). Anthropologist E might

participate in ICBS activities such as public education about damage to cultural heritage; providing training in military situations or to prepare for natural disasters; identifying resources during times of emergency; and advocating for cultural heritage in different venues.